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Abstract. Cloud computing and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) are emerging
and promising technologies, however their faster-pased adoption is hampered by
data security concerns. In the same time, Trusted Computing (TC) is experienc-
ing a revived interest as a security mechanism for IaaS. We address the lack of
an implementable mechanism to ensure the launch of a virtual machine (VM) in-
stance on a trusted remote host. Relying on Trusted Platform Modules operations
such as binding and sealing to provide integrity guarantees for clients that require
a trusted VM launch, we have designed a trusted launch protocol for generic VM
images in public IaaS environments. We also present a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of the protocol based on OpenStack, an open-source IaaS platform. The
results provide a basis for use of TC mechanisms within IaaS platforms and pave
the way for a wider applicability of TC to IaaS security.
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1 Introduction
One of the distinguished trends in IT operations today is the consolidation of IT sys-
tems onto common platforms. A key technology in realizing this is system virtualization
[1]. System virtualization makes it possible to streamline IT operations, save energy and
obtain better utilization of hardware resources. A virtualized computing infrastructure
allows cloud clients to run own services in form of Virtual Machines (VM) on shared
computing resources. This approach however introduces new challenges, as it means that
information previously controlled by one administrative domain and organization, is now
under the control of a third party provider and that the information owner loses direct
control over how data and services are used and protected. IaaS [2] is one of the business
models based on system virtualization and security aspects are among the main identi-
fied obstacles in the face of the adoption of IaaS3. The problems with securing IaaS are
evident not least through the fact that widely known platforms such as Amazon EC2,
Microsoft Azure, services provided by RackSpace and other IaaS services are plagued by
3 AFCEA Cyber Committee – October, 2011, http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/
documents/cloudcomputingsecuritylessonslearned_final.pdf
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vulnerabilities at several levels of the software stack, from the web based cloud manage-
ment console [3] to VM side-channel attacks, to information leakage, to collocation with
malicious virtual machine instances [4].
A promising approach towards reducing IaaS security threats and a mean to pro-
vide service confidence is the use of Trusted Computing technologies as defined by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [5]. The core component in the TCG-defined secu-
rity architecture is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a hardware module that can
be used as a trust anchor for software integrity verification in open platforms that also
offers protected storage for sensitive parameters. TPM usage and deployment models
for IaaS clouds are currently an active research area [6,7,8,9,10,11]. Earlier research has
introduced principles of a trusted IaaS platform [9], later extended to cover both trusted
VM launch [10] and VM migration [11]. These research results demonstrate principles of
combining basic TPM attestation mechanisms with standard cryptographic techniques
to design an infrastructure for VM protection. However, such solutions have limitations
with respect to security, complexity and target compute host selection procedures.
In this paper we describe a secure VM launch process that overcomes these limitations,
presenting a trusted launch protocol that does not require secure pre-packaging of the
VM image on the client side. The proposed protocol is in particular suitable for launching
generic virtual machine images (GVM images), i.e., VM images without any customer-
specific modifications. The concept is further introduced below. Furthermore, in order
to be usable in a significant proportion of IaaS deployment scenarios and to provide full
scheduling flexibility on the IaaS side, the protocol allows the IaaS provider to select a
target trusted compute host without directly involving the client. The main contributions
of this paper are:
1. Introduction of the concept of generic virtual machine images in the context of IaaS
security.
2. Description of a trusted launch protocol for generic VM images in IaaS environments.
3. Implementation of the proposed protocol based on a widely-known IaaS platform.
The paper is further organized as follows: In section II we give an overview of the most
important related work within trusted computing in IaaS environments; in section III we
define the attack scenario and formulate the problem area addressed by the current pa-
per; section IV presents the main contribution of the paper, namely a platform-agnostic
protocol for trusted generic virtual machine launching. In section V we perform a secu-
rity analysis of the proposed protocol and continue with a description of the prototype
implementation based on the OpenStack IaaS platform in section VI. We conclude in
section VII with a set of further research suggestions.
2 Related work
Application of trusted computing principles within IaaS environments has been the focus
of several research papers examined below.
Santos et al propose the design of a trusted IaaS platform (TCCP) that ensures VMs
are running on a secure hardware and software stack with a remote and untrusted host
[9]. The authors propose a remote attestation process where a trusted coordinator (T C)
stores the list of attested cloud compute hosts (CH) that run a “trusted virtual ma-
chine monitor” which can securely run the client’s VMs. Trusted hosts maintain in their
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memory an individual trusted key (TK) used for identification each time the client C
instantiates a VM on the trusted host. The paper presents a good initial set of ideas for
secure VM launch and migration, in particular the use of a T C. A limitation of this solu-
tion is that the TK resides in the memory of the trusted hosts, which leaves the solution
vulnerable to cold boot attacks [12] with keys extractable from memory. Furthermore, the
authors require that the T C maintains information about all hosts deployed on the IaaS
platform, but do not mention mechanisms for anonymizing this information, making it
valuable to an attacker and unacceptable for a public IaaS provider. Finally, the solution
lacks both mechanisms for revocation of the TK and considerations for the re-generation
of TK outside of host reboot.
A decentralized approach to integrity attestation is adopted by Schiffman et al in
[13]. The primary concerns addressed by this approach are the limited transparency of
IaaS platforms and the limits to scalability imposed by third party integrity attestation
mechanisms, as described in [9]. The authors examine a trusted cloud architecture where
the integrity of the IaaS hosts is verified by the IaaS client through a “cloud verifier”
(CV) proxy that resides in the application domain of the IaaS platform provider and is
accessible by the client. Thus, in the first step of the protocol the client evaluates the
integrity of the CV in order to include the CV into its trust perimeter if the integrity level
of the CV is considered satisfactory. Next, the CV sends attestation requests from compute
hosts CH, i.e. the hosts where the guest VM instance can potentially be deployed, thus
extending the trust chain to the CH. Finally, CH verifies the integrity of the VM image,
which is countersigned by the CV and returned to the client which evaluates the VM
image integrity data and allows or disallows the VM launch on the CH.
While the idea of increasing the transparency of the IaaS platform for the client is indeed
supported in industry [14,15], the authors do not clarify how the introduction of an
additional integrity attestation component in the architecture of the IaaS platform has
positive effects on the transparency of the cloud platform. Furthermore, the proposed
protocol increases the complexity model for the IaaS client both by introducing the
evaluation of integrity attestation reports of the CV and CH and introduction of additional
steps in the trusted VM launch, where the client has to take actions based on the data
returned from the CV. This requires either human interaction or a fairly complex integrity
attestation evaluation component (or a combination thereof) on the client side, making
a wide-scale adoption of the solution difficult.
Aslam et al proposed in [10] principles for secure VM launch on public cloud platforms
using trusted computing technologies. In order to ensure that the requested VM instance
is launched on a compute host CH with verifiable integrity, the client encrypts the VM
image (along with all the injected data) with a symmetric key sealed to a particular
configuration of CH, which is reflected through the values in the platform configuration
registers (PCR) of the TPM deployed on the CH. The solution proposed by Aslam et
al presents a suitable model in the case of trusted VM launch scenarios for enterprise
clients. It requires that the VM image is pre-packaged and encrypted by C prior to the
IaaS launch. However the proposed model does not cover the highly common scenario of
launching a generic VM image made available by the IaaS provider or uploaded by C.
Furthermore, we believe that reducing the number of steps required from C will facilitate
the adoption of the trusted IaaS model. Likewise, direct communication between C and
CH, as well as significant changes to the existing VM launch implementations in IaaS
platforms hamper the implementation of this protocol and should be avoided. This paper
reuses some of the ideas proposed in [10] and directly addresses the above limitations,
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namely actions to be performed by C, also touching upon the requirements towards the
launched VM image and required changes to the IaaS platform.
3 Attack model and problem description
Next we define the term ”generic virtual machine images”, describe the attack model
we assume in this paper and list top security and general design requirements applicable
given the defined attack model. We also discuss the characteristics that can be expected
from a well-designed generic VM image launch.
3.1 Generic virtual machine images
Denote by V the whole set of binary VM images and by v a particular VM image offered
by a vendor. Furthermore, denote by vt the GVM image offered to an arbitrary client at
time t:
Definition 1. ∀v ∈ V, ∀t, t′ ∈ T : vt ≡ vt′
The above definition implies that all of the GVM images of a particular distribution
offered by the vendor are binary identical. Furthermore, while such VM images may
have any software stack installed and configured, they do not contain any client-specific
customization.
A peculiar property of VM instances launched using GVM images is that they by
definition cannot posses verifiable properties that could distinguish any two different
instances. This property makes it difficult for an IaaS client to verify that the virtual
machine instance it interacts with runs on a trusted software stack.
To overcome these issues we suggest a launch protocol where we employ the TPM
functionality to first make sure that the GVM image is actually launched on a trustworthy
platform and subsequently utilize the trusted platform to verify the integrity of the GVM
image prior to the VM launch. The protocol performs both steps while maintaining
transparency from both client and IaaS provider’s points of view.
3.2 Attack model
We share the attack model with [9,10,11] which considers that privileged access rights
can be maliciously used by remote system administrators (Ar) of the IaaS provider.
This implies that we use a scenario which assumes that Ar can log in remotely to any
host maintained by the IaaS provider and obtain root access. However, in this model
Ar does not have physical access to the hosts. The only possibility for Ar to circumvent
this constraint is by succeeding to force a client to launch their VM instances on a
host outside the physically secured IaaS provider perimeter and controlled by the Ar.
Furthermore, we assume that an Ar obtaining remote root access to the host will not be
able to directly access the memory of the VMs residing on the host at that time, i.e. the
cloud host platform offers a closed box execution environment.
In a GVM image context this means that we consider both the attack where the Ar
attempts to launch a VM image on a non-trusted compute host instead of a trusted one
and the attack where Ar attempts to substitute the VM image requested by the client
with a maliciously modified VM image.
In the current attack model, a VM instance is considered trusted if and only if it
fulfills the following criteria:
V1. The VM image used for the instance is itself trusted;
2. The VM instance is started on a trusted compute host;
3. The VM instance has the client-generated verification token injected;
3.3 Requirements for a trusted GVM image launch protocol
Considering the threat model above, it is important for the client to be able to obtain rea-
sonable security guarantees form the IaaS provider. These include both trustworthiness
of the computing resources, as well as guarantees regarding VM integrity and confiden-
tiality. In order to also be cost and implementation efficient, the underlying infrastructure
should provide such guarantees with a minimal operational overhead without increasing
structural complexity. The expectations can be summarized as a set of basic requirements
on a trustworthy VM launch process:
– R1: The client shall have the mechanisms to ensure that the GVM image has been
launched on a trustworthy host.
– R2: The client should have the possibility to reliably determine that it is commu-
nicating with the GVM image launched on a secure host, and not with a different
GVM image instance.
– R3: The integrity of the launched GVM image must be verifiable by the target com-
pute host.
– R4: The trusted GVM image launch procedure should be scalable and have a mini-
mum impact on the performance of the IaaS platform.
– R5: Clients should have a transparent view of the secure launch procedures.
4 A secure launch protocol for generic VMs
Based on the above requirements for a secure launch protocol for generic VM images in
IaaS environments, we present a platform-agnostic protocol that shows principles of using
TPM functionality to ensure the integrity of the compute host and of the generic VM
image requested by the client. The below protocol addresses some of the security concerns
presented above by focusing on simplicity, transparency, scalability and minimal inter-
ference with the currently known setup of the IaaS implementations. Furthermore, the
protocol is based on widely-used and verified techniques, such as hashing and asymmetric
cryptography in combination with the functionality of the TPM.
The protocol requires the participation of four entities, three of which are typically
involved in VM launch in IaaS architectures:
1. Client (C) is a client of IaaS services and intends to launch or use a VM. C can be
both expert (e.g. capable to assessing the security of platform configurations based
on values from the measurement list, etc.) and a non-expert that requires access to
a generic VM instance launched and running on a trusted platform. In either case,
it is important that C is able to either verify or trust the security of GVM images
provided for launch.
2. Scheduler (S) is responsible for receiving from C requests for VMs instance launches
and scheduling and rescheduling VM instances on available compute hosts in the
provider cloud infrastructure. S should be able to function with the minimal possible
involvement in the security-specific message passing.
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3. The compute host (CH) is the target resource that will be chosen by the scheduler
to execute the particular VM. CH represents a physical or virtual server that is able
to host one or more virtual machine instances (however, this paper considers the
exclusively the case when the compute host is a physical server). For the purposes of
the proposed protocol, a CH must also be equipped with a TCG-compliant TPM as
well as be immune to modification attempts
4. The Trusted third party (T T P) is, as the name implies, trusted by both the Client
and the Cloud service provider can not be controlled or manipulated by the the the
IaaS provider. The recent breaches of Certificate Authorities have emphasized the
drawbacks of centralized security models and their susceptibility to attacks [16]. The
more complex the operations performed by the T T P, the higher the probability of
it having exploitable vulnerabilities. It is therefore important to keep the implemen-
tation of the T T P as simple as possible. The main task of the T T P is to attest the
configuration of the compute hosts that will host the generic VMs and assess their se-
curity profile according to predefined policies. Within the current trust model, T T Ps
could be implemented by C, as long as the IaaS provider agrees to that and the C
has the capability to set up and operate an attestation and evaluation engine.
For the purposes of the protocol, we also introduce the concept of security profile of
a CH, denoted as SP.
Definition 2. A security profile (SP) is a verfied setup of an OS including underlying
libraries and configuration files, which is considered to be trusted by all parties. SP can
range on an ascending integer scale which reflects the level of verification, from least to
most strict (and hence more restrictive).
The information needed to calculated the SP and also to compare the setup of two CHs
is stored in the integrity measurement log (IML), as the IML contains hashes of the
components that were loaded or used during the boot sequence of the CH. The validity
of the IML is confirmed through a signature using the attestation identity keys (AIK)
of a TPM. The AIK are persistent, non-migrateable keys that are used to sign and
authenticate by the means of an AIK certificate (denoted as AIK − cert) the validity of
the information provided by the TPM in case of an external attestation [17]. We thus
assume that the SP of any given CH can be deterministically calculated by each of the
parties involved in the protocol. 4
4.1 Platform-agnostic protocol description
The following steps are required in order to perform a trusted generic VM launch (Fig.
1, the steps of the protocol correspond to the steps in figure 5). Note that the while all of
the enumerated steps must be performed at least once in order to perform trusted VM
launch operations using GVM image, it is possible to optimize the protocol depending
on the specifics of the operational environment.
1. Before initiating the launch procedure, client C generates a sufficiently long nonce N ,
to be used as a proof token in communications between the C and the VM instance
and must be kept secret throughout the launch process.
4 The methodology for calculating the SP of a CH is out of the scope of this article.
5 Due to space limitations, ”Attestation data” was chosen as the condensed notation for:
TPKTTP , PKBind, TPM CERTIFY INFO, HTPM CERTIFY INFOAIK , IML,AIK − cert
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2. C creates a token which we denote by T , representing a data structure with informa-
tion necessary for the trusted VM launch. T contains N , the preferred SP and the
hash of the VM image to be launched, denoted as HVMimage
6. Finally, the token
is encrypted with the public key of T T P, denoted as PKTTP , while the encrypted
token is noted as TPKTTP . 7
3. C requests the scheduler (S) to load a generic VM by providing the following param-
eters in the request:
– VM type (e.g. CentOS, Debian, etc.);
– Required SP;
– URL of the T T P;
– Encrypted token TPKTTP generated in step (2);
SP will determine the lower bound of trust level required from the host CH on which
the VM will run, with stricter security profiles accepted.
4. S schedules a VM on the appropriate compute host, depending on its membership
in the respective security profile group and sends a request to generate a bind key
PKBind, also providing the URL of the T T P.
5. Once the destination host CH receives the bind key request, it retrieves a PCR-
locked non-migratable TPM-based bind key PKBind. This key can be periodically
regenerated by CH according to a administrator-defined policy, using the current
platform state represented by the TPM PCR. It is important to note that the values
of the PCRs should not necessarily be in a trusted state in order to create a trusted
state bind key.
6. In order to prove that the bind key is a non-migratable, PCR-locked, asymmetric
TPM key, CH uses the TPM CERTIFY KEY TPM command in order to retrieve the
TPM CERTIFY INFO structure signed with the TPM attestation indentity key [17],
which we denote as PKAIK ; we also denote the signed structure by
HTPM CERTIFY INFO
AIK . The TPM CERTIFY INFO data structure contains the hash
of the bind key and the PCR value required for the key usage.
7. CH sends an attestation request to the T T P through an HTTPS session using the
URL supplied by the C. The following arguments are sent in the request to T T P:
– Client-provided token TPKTTP
– Attestation data, which includes the public bind key, the TPM CERTIFY INFO struc-
ture, the hash of TPM CERTIFY INFO signed with the AIK8, the IML and the
AIK-certificate collectively represented as:
PKBind, TPM CERTIFY INFO, HTPM CERTIFY INFO
AIK , IML, AIK-cert .
8. T T P uses its private key PrKTTP , which corresponds to the public PKTTP to
attempt to decrypt the token TPKTTP .
9. T T P validates the attestation information obtained from CH as follows:
– Validates the AIK certificate;
– Validates the structure of the AIK-signed TPM CERTIFY INFO;
– Validates the key PKBind by comparing its digest with the digest received in
TPM CERTIFY INFO;
6 If non-repudiation of VM launch is required, the client should also sign the VM image hash
and include the signature and corresponding client certificate into the token.
7 To improve client experience these actions could be performed transparently to the client by
a web browser plugin when navigating to the cloud platform’s web interface.
8 Expressed as HTPM CERTIFY INFO
AIK
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– Calculates the hash of the PCR values HPCR based on the information in the
IML and compares it with the hash of PCR INFO, which is a component of
TPM CERTIFY INFO
10. T T P examines the entries in the IML in order to determine the trustworthiness
of the platform and decides whether the security preference SP is satisfied by the
current configuration of compute host CH.
11. If step 10 is true, T T P encrypts N and the hash HVMimage with the bind key
PKBind obtained from CH, to ensure that N is only available to CH in a trusted
state. By sending N encrypted with the public key PKBind available to the trusted
configuration of CH, the security perimeter expands to include three parties: C itself,
stateless T T P and compute host CH in its trusted configuration. This implies that
all actions performed by CH in its trusted configuration are trusted by default.
12. Prior to launching the VM, compute host CH decrypts N and HVMimage using the
TPM-issued PrKBind, which is available to it in its trusted configuration but stored
in the TPM; next, CH compares HVMimage obtained from the T T P with the hash
of the VM image offered by the IaaS provider and accepts the image for launch only
in case the values are equal.
13. CH injects N into the VM image prior to launching the VM.
14. CH returns an acknowledgement to S to confirm a successful launch.
15. To verify that the requested VM image has been launched on a secure platform, C
challenges the VM launched on host CH to prove its knowledge of N .
The fact that N is kept confidential allows it to be used as an authentication token
while establishing a secure communication channel between C and the launched VM.
N can be used as the pre-shared secret in order to add protection against man-in-the-
middle attacks when using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as specified in the password-
authenticated key-exchange protocol [18].
As mentioned above, some of the operations can be optimized taking into account
the operational environment. For example, the validity period of PKBind created in step
(5) can be adjusted. In a similar way, the T T P can have a cache of the PKBind keys
created by CH with verified trusted configuration. In this case, steps (9) and (10) can be
skipped for a certain number of cases, which can also be regulated by an administrative
policy. However, it is important to remember that the use of such a cache introduces
further complexity to the T T P the analysis of which is out of the scope of this paper.
5 Protocol security analysis
In this section we present a critical review of the protocol and highlight its improvement
areas that were left as future work. We begin by a security analysis of the protocol, in
order to outline its strengths and weaknesses.
Returning to the security concerns of C, expressed in the requirements towards the
trusted launch protocol formulated above, they are addressed as follows. Let ϕ be the
guest VM instance launched on CH, then:
– R1: Following above protocol, C and ϕ have a shared secret N . The fact that ϕ is
running on a trusted platform is ensured by the properties of the bind key used to
seal the shared secret N to the trusted configuration of CH;
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Fig. 1. Trusted generic VM launch protocol: C: Client; S: “Scheduler”; CH: Compute Host;
T T P: Trusted Third Party;
:C :S :CH :T T P:C :S :C :T T
1. Generate nonce
N
2. E(N ,SP,HVMimg)
TPKTTP
3. VM type, SP,
URL, TPKTTP
ok
4.
URL, TPKTTP
Gen. bind key
5. Create TPM Bind Key
PKBind
6. Sign PKBind
HTPM CERTIFY INFO
AIK
7. Attestation data
8. D(TPKTTP :PrKTTP )
N ,SP,HVMimg
9. V alidate attestation
V alid ∨ Invalid
10.Eval(IML)1SP
True ∨ False
11. Return encrypted token{N ,HVMimgPKBind
}
12. Unseal N ,HVMimg
Eval(HVMimg = HIaaSvm)
13. Inject N , launch VM
OK
14. Confirm launch to S
OK
ok
15. Challenge N
Return challenge N
X– R2: The fact that C is communicating with ϕ and not any other unexpected VM
instance ϕ′ is ensured through the combination of: a. verification of CH by the T T P,
b. possession of the token N encrypted with CH’s PCR trusted configuration-bound
TPM key and c. the VM image integrity verification performed by the compute host
prior to the launch. A failure at any of the steps of the above sequence would prevent
the trusted VM launch, a fact that would be verifiable by C.
– R3: Integrity of ϕ is ensured through the verification performed by CH in a trusted
state, prior to the trusted VM launch. Thus, ϕ is verified using the hash value ob-
tained from the T T P along with N . By verifying the hash of the GVM image with
the expected HVMimage provided by C, the CH ensures a one-to-one correspondence
between the GMVI that is to be launched and the GMVI expected by C. The chain
is completed once C verifies the presence of N injected into ϕ. The presence of the
correct token N guarantees the integrity of ϕ requested by C.
– R4: Scalability of the protocol is ensured by the lightweight nature of the operations
that are to be performed by both the T T P and the CH, flexibility in the choice of
the T T P and the ability of the scheduler to retry the CH selection procedure. While
a challenging topic, especially in the case of high-availability and heavy load IaaS
setups, the design of a scalable T T P architecture is out of the scope of this article.
– R5: Transparency of the trusted VM launch procedure is ensured by the introduction
of client parameters, such as the URL of the T T P, the trust level of the VM host and
the secret token generated by C. The ability to choose the T T P opens the possibility
for C to ensure the trustworthiness of the host attestation procedure, either through
audit controls of the T T P or by itself serving the role of the T T P.
5.1 T T P verification model
The stateless architecture of the T T P implies that it does not maintain knowledge of N
except for the moment of sealing it to CH and does not maintain any session state at any
point of the protocol. As a result, an Ar can only obtain N from T T P if they obtain
T T P’s private key PrKTTP . Furthermore, assessment of a hosts’ trust level according
to a deterministic algorithm which only takes two inputs (in the form of static set of
reference measurement data and dynamic attestation calls from any CH) will be easily
traceable and reproducible based on the original input data, without the need to recreate
or rely on a certain state of the TPP’s internal data. Finally, a stateless architecture of
the T T P contributes indirectly towards requirement R4.
5.2 Protocol caveats
One aspect that requires more attention is the possibility of a post-launch modification
of CH’s software stack. The runtime process infection method, which is a method for
infecting binaries during runtime 9 is one of the malicious approaches that could be used
in this situation. This scenario is in fact a common threat to all TCG-based systems,
also touched upon in [19] and is described in detail in [20] and should thus be prevented
using means within the platform which is part of the trusted computing base verified at
boot time, the presence of which is verified by the above protocol.
9 Runtime process infection, http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=8&mode=txt
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6 Protocol implementation
In order to validate the assumptions made during the protocol design phase, we have
implemented it as an extension to OpenStack, an open source IaaS platform chosen given
the open access to its codebase, its large community and the traction it has gained within
IaaS. This section briefly introduces the OpenStack architectural model and changes
made for the prototype implementation.
6.1 OpenStack IaaS platform
The Essex release of OpenStack comprises five core components (projects), namely Com-
pute (Nova), Image Service (Glance), Object Storage (Swift), Identity Service (Keystone)
and Dashboard (Horizon). Nova has several sub-components: nova-api, nova-compute,
nova-schedule, nova-network, nova-volume, plus an SQL database and message queue
functionality to pass messages between sub-components. OpenStack components affected
by the protocol implementation are mentioned here in more detail:
– Nova-api is the interface for nova- compute and volume API calls. It is through this
interface most of the cloud orchestration operations are performed. The interface
supports both the OpenStack and Amazon EC2 APIs.
– Nova-compute handles virtual machine instance life cycle tasks through hypervisor
API calls. Notably the libvirt and XenAPI hypervisor APIs are supported.
– Nova-schedule is responsible for selecting compute host(s) to run virtual machine
instances on. The host selection process is determined by which scheduling policy/al-
gorithm is employed.
– The nova SQL database holds tables and relations to describe the state of nova, such
as launched instances and network configurations.
– The Dashboard is a web based GUI for OpenStack operation and administration. It
interfaces nova-api.
6.2 Prototype implementation
Below are the main additions to OpenStack required for the prototype implementation.
Nova SQL database The nova SQL database has been extended to include tables to hold
the available compute hosts and security profiles of compute hosts:
– A security profile is an integer in the range 1-10, with a higher number being more
trusted than a lower number.
– The security profile of a compute host is global, rather than specific per e.g. tenant.
Dashboard and nova-api The Dashboard web based GUI has been extended to include
the option to request compute host attestation, minimum security profile selection, to-
ken TPKTTP entry and T T P URL provision (3) into the “Launch Instance” dialog.
This information is included in the OpenStack API HTTP payload to nova-api, which
propagates the information to the scheduler.
In the prototype implementation steps (1) and (2) are performed by a script which
outputs TPKTTP , which then can be manually input into the Dashboard dialog. Note
that it is not an option to let Dashboard provide functionality for generating TPKTTP ,
since Dashboard is not trusted by C.
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Scheduler, compute host and virtualization driver The nova scheduler is a central com-
ponent as it decides on which compute host a certain VM instance will be launched.
Each scheduler works according to a specific configurable algorithm and several scheduler
implementations are available in OpenStack by default. In the SimpleScheduler imple-
mentation, the scheduler looks for the least loaded compute host and schedules the VM
instance to be launched on that host.
We extend the behavior of the SimpleScheduler to include the policy that a host must
belong to a certain security profile SP or stricter in order to be acceptable for hosting the
VM instance. This policy is realized as follows: first the scheduler looks up the recorded
security profile of the host in the nova database and proceeds if SP is sufficient compared
to the requirements of C (corresponds to (4)). The second step is to request the host to
attest itself with T T P. If SP was not sufficient, the next eligible host is selected.
Steps (5)-(7) are perfomed by CH, followed by T T P in steps (8)-(11).
Token TCH = {N , HVMimage}PKBind is returned from T T P to CH after which CH
includes the token in the return message to the scheduler. If the attestation was successful,
the scheduler requests the now trusted CH to launch the VM instance and includes TCH
in the request.
Next, CH decrypts TCH and obtains N and HVMimage. To verify the integrity of the
VM image, HVMimage is included in the call to the virtualization driver (libvirt is used
by the prototype), which fetches the VM image from Glance and caches it locally on CH.
The hash of the cached image is calculated and compared to HVMimage. If the hashes do
not match, an exception is raised. Otherwise, the launch procedure continues (12) and
the file injection capability of Nova is used to inject N into the file system of the VM
image to be launched (13). The VM image is then used to launch the VM instance on
CH and steps (14) and (15) are completed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a detailed trusted launch protocol for generic VM image
launch in IaaS environments. Furthermore, we have provided a prototype implementation
of the launch protocol in OpenStack. Detailed measurement and evaluation, as well as
alternative implementation choices have been left for future work.
The presented results make a case for broadening the range of use cases for trusted
computing by applying it to IaaS environments, especially within the security model of
an untrusted IaaS provider. Trusted computing offers capabilities to securely perform
data manipulations on remote hardware owned and maintained by a third party with a
minimal risk for data integrity. The presented design is directly applicable to the process
of developing a trusted virtualized environment within a public IaaS service.
Future research recommendations can be grouped into three categories:
First is the extension of the trust chain to other operation of VM instances (migration,
suspension, updates, etc.), as well as data storage and virtual network communication
security.
The second category includes addressing some assumptions of the proposed launch
protocol, e.g. the assumption that the VM host configuration is not changed after the
trusted launch of the VM instance, since even in the case of a bona fide IaaS provider the
VM host can be compromised through runtime process infection. A technique to enable
C to either directly or through mediated access discover such events and protect the data
used by the VM instance is a promising research topic.
XIII
The third category focuses on the design and implementation of the evaluation policies
of the TTP. The current assumption is that the TTP has access to information regarding
“secure” configurations and the PCR values. However, taking into account the diversity
of available libraries, as well as the different combinations in which they can be loaded
during the boot process, verification of PCR values (such as values stored in PCR10 and
reference values in binary runtime measurements) becomes a less trivial task.
XIV
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